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350 Trendelenburg on HegeVs System. 

the Jews. The following division of universal history results r 
(1) the National state, (2) the Theocratic state, (3) the state 
of Humanity. He concludes with the Germans because, with- 
in the Caucasian race, they are in fact that race to which the 
initiative of all further movement in universal history falls. 
From Europe they have spread themselves by navigation 
into every quarter of the world. They compel innumerable 
peoples in a state of nature, who have previously stood outside 
the process of universal history, either to enter into it or to 
vanish. They compel, also, the old historical nations of the 
Orient to remove their rigid exclusiveness, and to attempt 
self-regeneration by a higher principle. 



THE LOGICAL QUESTION IN HEGEL'S SYSTEM. 

Translated from the German of Trbndblvnbukg by Thos. Davidson. 
(Continued.) 

It has been often enough repeated, and Germany knows 
the formula by heart, that Hegel's great merit is that he 
defines God as a subject, in contradistinction to Spinozism 
which defines Him as substance. In the reply this is like- 
wise enlarged upon (p. 116 ei alibi). It may, perhaps, have 
been necessary to call attention on every possible occasion 
to this, inasmuch as a modern Spinozism has developed itself 
out of Hegel. An appeal is made to the consciences of those 
opponents who " assault Hegel with murderous intent, and 
mercilessly mangle him," not to condemn a philosophy in 
which God is assumed to be spirit (p. 131). Hegel's highest 
absolute principle is made to depend upon the significance of 
subject (p. 116), and the Logical Investigations are treated 
cavalierly because they do not touch this point — this solu- 
tion, given by Hegel — of the fundamental question of all phi- 
losophy. Is this last true? In a philosophy of cognition 
the mere dogma counts for nothing, while the process by 
which it is reached and proved counts for everything. The 
question therefore is, how this applies to Hegel. In him, the 
said process is based on the important and diflBlcult part of 
the Logic {Encyclopadia, § 150 sqq.), in which it is supposed 



Trendelenburg on HegeVs System. 351 

to be shown how, according to dialectic reason, the necessity 
which is the attribute of substance passes over into the free- 
dom of the idea. There and nowhere else in Hegel is the 
primum, movens which draws the thinking on from substance 
to subject. In the Logical Investigations, therefore (I., p. 50 
sqq.*), this most important of all dialectic transitions, upon 
which the weight of the whole system rests, was carefully 
considered, and shown to be without any support, and to 
give way and vanish as soon as it is touched. While sub- 
stance may get outside of itself, subject, we are told, is with 
itself {apud se). But it was shown that this being-with-itself 
of Hegel's rests merely upon a vague, feeble comparison — a 
play of similar expressions. It was demonstrated that the 
process by which it was reached would apply as well to blind 
emanation as to free creation from the idea of purpose, and 
that, hence, it contains no progress from the doctrine of sub- 
stance to subject. The logical difficulty was at the same time 
made apparent ; for it was the logical question that was under 
discussion. How does the reply venture to speak as if no no- 
tice had been taken of this determination, which is supposed 
to condition all the rest? Does it go even so far, seeing that 
it appeals so often to the elevation of substance to subject, as 
to remove those inherent obstacles which were shown to ex- 
ist? It was easier to pass over the objections raised without 
one word of comment. If, however, it is true that, in Hegel, 
the doctrine which is so warmly recommended in the reply 
rests, in its deepest metaphysical basis, on this sole point of 
the Logic, then that doctrine must stand or fall with it. 

That, in its new shape, it seeks for a new support, is of no 
consequence ; if it is to continue true to Hegel, it cannot get 
round this original ground; while, if it does not continue 
true to Hegel, it no longer comes within the limits of our 
discussion. 

In Hegel's Logic, the point in question is one of the bold- 
est turns taken by the negativity. If, as is the case, the reply 
accuses us of not having considered closely enough this fun- 
damental law of all thinking, which is likewise a fundamen- 
tal law of all being, what we have said above is a sufficient 

* Third edition, p. 51 sqq. — Tr. 



352 Trendelenburg on HegeVs System. 

refutation of the charge. Why should the reply at all insist 
upon investigations, seeing that itself does not condescend to 
any of those proposed to it? It is, however, the opposite of 
correct to assert that the Negativity has not been investi- 
gated. The Negativity, the perpetual spur of the dialectic 
movement of thought, so highly extolled again in the reply, 
rests, in Hegel's view, on negation and identity ; and indeed 
on the latter, inasmuch as it is the negation of negation. 
Both these logical appliances were fully and fairly put to 
the test, both in their principle and in their different applica- 
tions, and rejected as ambiguous and untenable {Log. Inv. 
I., pp. 30-56). Sometimes, in Hegel, the Negativity shoots 
off on the leaping-pole of the 'progresses in infinitum; but it 
also broke down under the hands of criticism {Log. Int. I., pp. 
55 sq.) Before Gabler asserted that the author of the Logi- 
cal Investigations, h&ving no knowledge of the fiict that the 
negativity was the soul in the forms of dialectic development, 
or of the manner of its operation, had not specially made it 
a subject of criticism, he might have read those passages, or 
else he might have shown what logical element, besides those 
discussed, was contained in the negativity. It was incumbent 
upon him, not to repeat in vague terms a eulogy on negativ- 
ity, but sihiply, iii accordance with this fundamental law, to 
employ the energetic negation of negation on the negation of 
our criticism, so as not to allow the negativity to stick fast in 
the negation, but to bring it out in the positivity claimed, for 
it. But there was not even an attempt made in this direction. 
" Negativity " is an imposing word ; as an abstraction, it 
keeps the intuition suspended and the mind in wonderment. 
As Plato in the Philebus tells us that the youth triumphed 
as if they had found a treasure of wisdom, when they made 
their first acquaintance with the One and the Many, and, in 
their enthusiasm, applied it to every concept, so precisely it 
is with the cognate fundamental law of negativity : for, of 
course, everything is intrinsically negative, in everything 
there is flux, in everything there is distinction ; and what is 
easier than to place the aim " which repels itself from itself" 
under negativity? But the result is much less considerable 
in the case of the negativity than in that of the great treasure- 
house of "The One and the Many"; for it is such an abstrac- 



Trendelenburg on HegeVs System;. 353 

tion as no longer represents an original and productive Uni- 
versal, but has upset itself and thus lost all tangibility. If 
we are honored with some sprinklings of praise, because the 
principle of motion brought forward in the Logical Investiga- 
tions is similar to negativity, we object to any such kinship. 
Negativity is like a large mantle, of which many folds can be 
made, to stow away the most various things. It is, as our 
investigation has shown, entirely indefinite and ambiguous. 
Against it the Logical Investigations rebelled, and endea- 
vored to free the conceptive faculty from the spell with 
which this and similar words had bound it. They restored 
to intuition its freedom, and thereby to thought its defi- 
niteness, by proving that movement, which outlines and 
produces a picture, was the intellectual principle of intui- 
tion and form. The Proteus of negativity would do well to 
keep at a respectful distance from it ; he would meet his 
death in it. 

In the Logical Investigations, and in the brief statement 
afterwards published, the result of the inquiry into the dia- 
lectic method went to show that it was per se impossible. 
Our author feels, in spite of his attempt to make the position 
of the dialectic method less fatal, that still Hegel's philoso- 
phy becomes an impossible system, and therefore enters the 
strongest protests against this ruling. Is the existence of 
the case a proof of its intrinsic possibility ? That will not 
pass muster ; for, as the reply itself says, the very questions 
at issue are those of existence and recognition. Or, was the 
judgment in the Logical Investigations merely a feint an- 
nounced with a flourish of trumpets? Neither can that be 
asserted. For the judgment was well supported by the proofs 
brought forward in the course of a long investigation. It was 
proved, and in the statement of the position of the question 
again asserted, that all the logical means used by the dialec- 
tic method fell to pieces, and, measured by the standard of 
their own purpose, were sadly insufficient and even impossi- 
ble. The simple conclusion was, that the dialectic method 
was intrinsically impossible, because its means were so. 
From this demonstration, apart from good assurances, which 
are not spared, but which avail nothing' there is but one 
means of escape. It would have to be shown that those logi- 

Vol. vi.— 23 

2 3 * 



854 Trendelenburg on HegeVs System. 

cal means (negation, identity, progress in infinitum) really 
perform what they promise, and, just because they perfonn 
it, have an energic actuality over and above their intrinsic 
possibility. Has this been done ? The reply takes the shorter 
way of preferring not -to touch the point at all (p, 204). We 
are perfectly satisfied with this, since, supported by the old 
grounds, we may again pronounce the judgment that the dia- 
lectic method of pure thought is in itself impossible, and add 
that it has not been rendered a whit more possible by the 
reply in question. 

Hegel's Logic asserted that, as opposed to all intuition, 
even to the geometric figure, it moved in the element of pure 
thought, and, without any presupposition, developed from 
this alone an uninterrupted "immanent" series of metaphys- 
ical concepts. "We, on the other hand, showed, both in 
general and in particular, that the presuppositionless logic 
everywhere presupposes the principle and the general activ- 
ity of intuition, and thus in secret possesses a picture which 
in public it contemns ; we showed that, instead of developing 
from itself a closely-knit series, it smuggled in the despised 
intuitions of experience, diluted and weakened, and gave 
them out as products of its own soil. What has the reply to 
say to this thorough -going proof? "The manifest discovery," 
it says, (p. 193 sqq.) "does not touch the thing itself — the pure 
concepts — in their distinct form, but merely their Origin — the 
source from which they come into thought"; it does not touch 
the what of the pure immaterial concepts and determinations 
of thought, but rather- tfieir origin in tJiougM. In the first 
instance, this is certainly the whole question. Did the asser- 
tion of presuppositionless thinking, and of immanent inter- 
connection, mean anything else than that the concepts did 
not flow from a foreign source, e.g. from intuition, but from 
the native one of pure thought? Only the delusiveness of 
this magnificent promise was to be shown. The reply, if we 
understand it correctly, admits this proof — and how much is 
thereby admitted ! — but it consoles itself with the distinction 
that the question of the whence does not touch the whA^t. Is 
this possible in the present instance? Hitherto, for exam- 
ple, it was asserted in Hegel's Logic, that continuous and 
discrete, extensive and intensive magnitude, attraction and 



Trendelenburg on HegeVs System. 356 

repulsion, all occurring in the first part of the Logic, not as 
concrete examples and applications, but as the purest, deter- 
minations, were to be seized as concepts of the pure think- 
ing without intuition, and therefore without that movement 
which produces the geometrical figure. If the opposite of 
this it has been proved, it touches the wTiat of the pure con- 
cepts so far, that there are no such " pure concepts " in dis- 
junct form. The author of the reply is perhaps aware of this ; 
for he glides rapidly over the dangerous point, and vents his 
spleen in heavy charges of empiricism and materialism, with 
which he loads the Logical Investigations. 

We shall not waste a word on these charges,* since the per- 
son who can believe that such accusations will cling to the 
work, cannot have read it, or must have read it merely with 
the eyes on his face. It is true that it does not deal with any 
sort of dialectic idealism, which, unconcerned about any con- 
nection with the other sciences, and despising any contradic- 
tion which the latter, with the support of facts, might raise 
against Philosophy, dwells on the royal heights of the pure 
idea, with an empire all to itself, perfectly secure against 
being confounded with. empiricism. If, however. Philosophy 
is, as Schleiermacher somewhere calls it, the central science, 
and there is no centre except with reference to the circumfer- 
ence, just as there is no circumference save with reference to 
the centre, then surely the time has come at last to strive for 
further progress, and to bring about a living connection be- 
tween the central and the peripheral sciences. Logic must 
become a metaphysic of the actual sciences, in the sense that 
it must comprehend their real principles in order to compre- 
hend the act of thinking within its sphere, and thus to become 
a true logic. Are we to be accused of empiricism because we 
deal with experience in this sense ? The fact that we are so 
accused is indeed perfectly intelligible from the stand-point 
of dialectic idealism, but not from that of impartial criti- 
cism, which would have justice enough to remark and to 
recognize, that we on all occasions and even in the very midst 
of experience look only for its spiritual origin, i.e. the very 
thing which has not experience in it. 

It wais our wish, in writing the previous article, to treat 
the logical question in Hegel's system by itself, and to keep 



356 Trendelenburg on HegeVs System. 

apart, as something altogether foreign, our own logical inves- 
tigations in 80 far as they investigate positively the essence 
of cognition. In the reply, the two are commingled, and 
defence, as is perfectly fair, is supplemented by attack. We 
must therefore add a few words in regard to the method of 
criticism, in order to remove from the question at issue the 
false lights and shadows that are thrown upon it from this 
quarter. 

Firstly, there is one thing characteristic. In a long book 
written to criticise another, the reader looks in vain for the 
real content of the latter, as forming the basis of the criti- 
cism. He looks in vain for an outline of the Investigations, 
for a sketch of their method, for the sum of their results, for 
a presentation of the fundamental thought. Only from such 
a survey could he derive a notion of what the Logical Inves- 
tigations specially attempt, and whether they unite to form 
a spiritual whole. A person who knows a system only by 
the headings of the paragraphs, is not likely to find it in 
them ; whereas the person who is able to follow it through 
the windings of the investigations and to restate it in his own 
words, will not miss it. When the reader of the reply puts 
it down, he is as wise respecting the purpose and essence of the 
Logical Investigations as he was before he took them up ; 
or, what is perhaps worse, his head is filled with the most 
contradictory judgments, since the reply is a perfect conglo- 
merate of appreciation and depreciation, respect and disre- 
spect. At one time, the author of the Logical Investigations 
is a disciple of Aristotle, who, be it remembered, is counted 
by Hegel among the speculative philosophers; at another 
time, he is an empiricist and a materialist, utterly destitute 
of anything speculative: according to one passage, he tights 
with Hegel for the present world- consciousness ; at another, 
he is related only to Bacon and Locke, although these are 
long ago baried for Jorerman science; — at one time, his phi- 
losophy is valuable as a propaedeutic which might pass for 
Hegelian ; at another, he has written only for "business men" 
(p. 177); — at one time, the Logical Investigations appear to 
merit a place among literary productions ; at another, they 
are described as a mere rude compilation, without plan or 
principle (pp. 178 sqq.), so that the reader cannot help won- 



Trendelenburg on HegeVs System. 357 

dering why, for the sake of such a book, our anther under- 
took to write another hook, and why he found himself com- 
pelled by it to put his old system into a new shape ; — at one 
time, the reply attributes to the development of the catego- 
ries and principles {principia) a value which it afterwards 
lowers by the additional assertion that Hegel also has them, 
only in a somewhat different shape (?!); — at one time, he 
denies to the enumeration (which, a moment before, he called 
development) every claim to system ; — in another place, it 
honors the organic world-view with which the Logical Inves- 
tigations close with a certain amount of applause ; at another, 
it hints that this world-view is such as might be suitable for 
children, although, of course, it would be of no use to them, 
as they do not philosophize (p. 188). 

But has Gabler quite perused, or quite overlooked, the 
Logical Investigations, about which he has written a book ? 
We must be allowed to express our doubts. He would hard- 
ly, for example, have ventured (pp. 184 sq.), in plain terms, 
to refer the author of the Logical Investigations to Hegel's 
treatment and derivation of the categories, if he had remem- 
bered that the same had been subjected to a careful examin- 
ation {Log. Inv. H., pp. 62 sqq.), in which they were shown to 
be entirely unequal to developing the possibility of this con- 
cept, and proving the necessity of its dominance. He would 
hardly, had he known the whole, have given all kinds of good 
counsels, which the Logical Investigations had long ago fol- 
lowed of their own accord (e.g. cf. p. 184 ad fin., with Log. 
/wws^. n., pp. 62 sqq.) He would hardly have hinted — we 
cannot understand the passage otherwise (p. 187) — that the 
Logical Investigations, pregnant with materialism, " looked 
upon thought as a mere accessory, or something merely 
secondary and superinduced," if he had considered, what is 
pointedly shown (H., pp. 62 sqq.), that the world, penetrated 
as it is with purpose, can be understood only by admitting 
the priority of thought. He would hardly have charged the 
Logical Investigations with a blind reverence for nature 
(e.g. p. 179), if he had only remarked their general tendency, 
which is to prove that the comprehension of nature, in move- 
ment and in purpose, is derived entirely from the original 
Spiritual in nature. He \vould hardly have ventured to tax 



358 Trendelenburg on HegeVs System. 

the whole view with vulgar empiricism (pp. 193, 197, &c.), if 
he had considered that same general tendency, and if he had 
been aware of the war which the Logical Imestigations wage 
with empiricism, and that too in the very midst of the facts> 
for the sake of this tendency (e.g. I., pp. 206 sqq., 274, sqcL-, 
&c.) He would scarcely have had the hardihood to assert (p. 
200) that the Logical Investigations abandon the a-priority 
of time and space, while, on the contrary, they everywhere 
strive to prove that the spiritual d-priority of movement with 
its products, time and space, alone aflfbrds a key to the great 
scientific, d priori fact of pure mathematics, and use every 
eflfort to show that the objectivity of these categories is not 
thereby excluded, and that the same d-priority is the basis 
of all empiricism (cf. the whole of Investigations 5 and 6, 
pp. 124-277). He would hardly have ventured to squeeze a 
single expression respecting the idea, till he brought out of it 
the result, that, according to the Logical Investigations, it is 
only as substance (Spinozan ? !) that God lies at the basis of 
the world (p. 189), if he had remembered that the idea is idea 
only through the creative thought of aim {ZwecJc) (H., pp. 359 
sqq.) He would hardly have ventured to counsel the Logical 
Investigations to follow the fundamental principle of the Hege- 
lian system, which is, at the same time, the logical principle 
of form, through the sphere of philosophy, and prove it insuffi- 
cient and incapable of explaining anything, if he had reflected 
that the section on the dialectic method and the criticism of 
the Hegelian notion of aim have performed said task, and that 
it is precisely Hegel's logical principle of form that so com- 
pletely breaks down in the detailed examination of his devel- 
opment of the judgment (H., pp. 190 sqq., and the syllogism 
(H., pp. 251 sqq.) He would scarcely have said that the Logi- 
cal Investigations were unacquainted with the Hegelian 
syllogism, and acted as if they had confounded it with the 
scholastic syllogism, if he had remembered how (H., pp. 251- 
279) they first turn it round and consider it from all sides, 
before they declare that Hegel's twisted theory of three times 
three syllogisms, which are supposed to produce and classify 
the system of things in their reality, was manufactured and 
untrue. These facts are incredible, but they are facts. If our 
author could overlook all these and many other things, where, 



Trendelenburg on HegeVs Systems 359 

with, such defects of knowledge and misconceptionb in rog^ard 
to matters of fact, remains the right to criticize ? 

The author of the reply cannot get rid of himself. For what 
is peculiar in the writings of others, for the specific in the 
tout ensemble of the doctrine of his opponents, he has no eye, 
and, therefore, no expression. He evidently feels hostile to 
an investigation which pursues a path different from his, and 
which takes pains, in dealing with the elements of thought, 
till, after quiet progress, it comes at last to a point at which, 
the elements necessarily coalesce in the fact of a whole. Ever 
and everywhere the absolute comes up in his writing, as if it 
were the only question, and as if human thinking, which, 
after all, in the broad sphere of the sciences, thinks the finite 
in the first instance, did not move at all in the finite. It shows 
itself likewise in the outward form, so that he never succeeds 
in bridling and controlling the association of his own ideas 
long enough to make those of other people his own. For 
while, as a general rule, people are not given to interrupting 
each other, he everywhere interlards other people's state- 
ments with interjections and remarks of his own. "When 
these parentheses and interjections are taken away, there re- 
mains very little counter-argument. But parentheses will 
hardly pass for discussions, or interjections for solid judg- 
ments. After all, there is a great difference between real and 
manufactured consequeuces. Real ones lie in that which is 
based upon a principle, and such of those scientific conse- 
quences as do not appear in the Logical Investigations will 
be shown hereafter in the further carrying out of the thought. 
Manufactured consequences, on the other hand, lie in one- 
sided half-truths picked up at random, and in words caught 
and pressed into service (p. 189). "We decline to accept any 
ransom for the captives taken in our work ; they will get freed 
without our help, in the mind of the intelligent reader. The 
objections raised in the reply are altogether not of a kind to 
prevent us in any way from continuing our superstructure on 
the basis of the Logical Investigations. At the same time, it 
is quite natural that our opponents should try to make us oc- 
cupy an "obsolete stand-point" {uberwunderer Standpunct), 
one assigning us to empiricism, a second to Aristotle, a third 
to Kant, a fourth to Herakleitos. Let us, think they, dress 



360 ^Trendelenburg on HegeVs System. 

him up in some old worn-out dress of the world-spirit ; and 
the present, which wants fashion, will not look at him. There 
is, perhaps, reason in that. How many stand-points, however, 
Hegel has made obsolete, is shown by the present rebellion 
of all. 

It is the aim of the reply to force the examination of 
human thought ever toward the Absolute, and to maintain 
Hegel's Absolute, — although in a new shape, which will per- 
haps be as little recognized by foes or friends as Gabler is 
inclined to recognize the dressing up of Hegel's in the gold 
frame of fancy and the trappings of poetry (p. IV.) But as 
this new shape, like every other shape which calls itself an 
emanation from Hegel, rests on the dialectic method, every- 
thing, as was shown in the previous article, reduces itself to 
the question whether the dialectic method of pure thinking 
is correct. If it is false, there arises from it no knowledge, 
and no new mode of seizing the Absolute. It is therefore of 
no use to swing round in one's own circle ; the question al- 
ways comes up again : What has been done to redeem the 
dialectic method ? for it is the basis of the whole. 

In the previous article, the main points at issue were clear- 
ly set forth ; they were, 

1°. The suppositionless beginning; 
2°. The immanent interconnection ; 
3°. The significance of the negation ; 
4°. The power of identity; 

5°. The application of the progressus in infinitum ; 
6°. The methodical Tiysteron-proteron of the dialectic de- 
velopment ; 
7°. The delusiveness of the Hegelian syllogism. 

Among these, again, the assertion of the absence of presup- 
position, the negation, and the identity, stand prominent as 
the real pillars of the whole edifice. In the reply, there is as 
good as nothing on all these points— at least, there is scarcely 
one word looking at all like a refutation, or really bringing 
home a misapprehension. It brings no danger except to the 
cause which the reply defends, when it refuses to occupy 
itself with all these things, or, as we say, does not stand up 
and hold its own. Thus, then, the Logical Question in HegeVs 
System stands at precisely the same point where it stood at 



The Merchant of Venice. 361 

the close of the previous essay ; there is not a single iota 
cleared up. At best, we have been shown, by one example, 
how it can not be cleared up. 

We are told in the Theaitetos of Plato, in connection with 
that movement, to which Hegel compared the negativity, con- 
cerning the disciples of the profound Herakleitos : — "About 
these speculations of Herakleitos which, as you say, are as 
old as Homer, or even older still, the Ephesians themselves, 
who profess to know them, are downright mad, and you can- 
not talk with them about them. For, in accordance with their 
text-books, they are always in motion ; but as for dwelling 
upon an argument or a question, and quietly asking and an- 
swering in turn, they are absolutely without the power of 
doing this ; or, rather, they have no particle of rest in them, 
and they are in a state of negation of rest which no words 
can express. If you ask any one of them a question, he will 
produce, as from a quiver, sayings ^rief and dark, and shoot 
them at you ; and if you inquire the reason of what he has 
said, you will be hit by some other new-fangled word, and 
will make no way with any of tTiem, nor they with one 
(mother^ 



THE MERCHANT OF VENICE. 

By D. J. Snidkr. 

\Conclutiicm of the Article in the April number.'] 

In a late number of the Journal there was a partial analy- 
sis of Shakespeare's "Merchant of Venice." "We now propose 
to complete that criticism by extending it to other parts of 
the same drama. But ftrst it will be well to recapitulate the 
results arrived at in the former essay. Only the leading col- 
lision of the play was there developed, that between Shylock 
and Antonio. The first characteristic to be observed in re- 
spect to these two characters is that the one was a Jew and 
the other a Christian ; hence the historical collision involved 
in the drama was between the Hebrew and the modern world. 
But, in the second place, this collision was elevated from a 
merely natural to a spiritual basis by the ends which these 
two men proposed ; that of Shylock being the acquisition of